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The familiar claim of Chinese currency manipulation is generally asserted without reference to em-
pirical evidence. To investigate the legitimacy of the claim, we ask if the undervalued misalignment 
found in the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) over the past dec-
ade has any recent historical precedents. Four cases are examined: the Japanese yen, the Deutsche 
mark, the Singapore dollar and the Taiwan dollar. Panel-based misalignment estimates of the REER 
of the four currencies are obtained using quarterly data from the late 1970s to the early 2000s. Our 
estimates suggest that there are precedents to the recent misalignment of the RMB in terms of mag-
nitude, duration or breadth of currency coverage, and that a net build-up in foreign asset does not 
necessarily result in currency misalignment. In addition to finding little empirical justification for 
the claim of Chinese currency manipulation, we note that REER misalignment runs a risk of propa-
gating inflation in the home economy. 
 
JEL classification: F31; F41; O57; C23 
 




“…that men do not learn much from the lessons of history is the most important of lessons history has to 
teach.”           
− Aldous Huxley 
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Kiinan valuuttakurssin manipuloinnista esitetään usein väitteitä ilman, että väitteiden tueksi esite-
tään juurikaan empiiristä näyttöä.  Näiden väitteiden todenmukaisuuden tarkastelemiseksi tässä 
keskustelualoitteessa tutkitaan, löytyykö taloushistoriasta esimerkkejä sellaisesta valuuttakurssien 
epätasapainosta, joka vastaisi Kiinan juan renminbin (RMB) reaalisen kauppapainoisen valuutta-
kurssin (REER) viimeaikaista kehitystä. Tutkimuksessa keskitytään neljään esimerkkiin: Japanin je-
niin, Saksan markkaan sekä Singaporen ja Taiwanin dollariin 1970-luvun lopulta 2000-luvun alku-
puolelle. Neljännesvuosiaineistoon perustuvat paneeliestimoinnit osoittavat, että viimeaikaisesta 
taloushistoriasta löytyy esimerkkejä, jotka vastaavat sekä suuruudeltaan että kestoltaan juan ren-
minbin reaalikurssin kehitystä. Tulokset osoittavat myös, ettei valuuttavarannon kasvu välttämättä 
johda valuuttakurssin epätasapainoon. Tukea väitteille, joiden mukaan Kiina manipuloisi valuut-
tansa kurssia, ei juuri löydy. Lisäksi tulokset viittaavat siihen, että reaalisen kauppapainoisen kurs-
sin epätasapaino voi johtaa inflaation kiihtymiseen kotimarkkinoilla. 
 
JEL: F31; F41; O57; C23 
 
Asiasanat: reaalinen kauppapainoinen valuuttakurssi (REER), juan), jeni, Saksan markka, Singapo-
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1  Introduction 
 
It is fashionable – even received wisdom − in certain political and business circles to attribute pre-
vailing global trade imbalances to “Chinese currency manipulation.” Indeed, demands for faster ap-
preciation of the renminbi (RMB) to restore global trade balances reached a rather shrill pitch on 
September 29, 2010, just days before a national mid-term election, with the US House of Represen-
tatives overwhelmingly passing a bill imposing retaliatory import duties on Chinese goods to punish 
the country for “manipulating” its exchange rate to unfair export advantage. Given the deep accep-
tance of this perceived Chinese cheating, the dearth of scholarly studies presenting hard evidence of 
China‟s currency manipulation (or even methodical discussions of what might constitute currency 
manipulation) is striking. Perhaps the most important study in this respect is Staiger and Stykes 
(2008), who, using a combination of international law analysis and trade models, find little in the 
way of economic or legal grounds to support China‟s alleged currency manipulation. 
The present study delves into this issue from empirical and historical angles. Although our 
approach differs from the more theoretical work of Staiger and Stykes (2008), we share their basic 
notion of treating the issue from a combined economic-legal perspective. Our legal analysis relies 
on stare decisis, the common law principle of standing by precedent embraced by US jurispru-
dence.
1 
Currency misalignments are fairly common, so the label “currency manipulation” is typi-
cally reserved for special instances of prolonged and substantial misalignment. Hence, our enquiry 
starts by asking whether the severity of misalignment in the real effective value of the RMB over 
the past decade was, in fact, prolonged and substantial, and if so, how the Chinese misalignment 
compares to recent historical precedents. Our misalignment estimates are taken from Qin and He 
(2011), whose study is based on quarterly time series for the period 1999-2008. Misalignment is 
defined primarily as long-run deviation from the real effective exchange rate (REER) measured 
against a multilateral currency basket of 22 economies that account for roughly 70 % of China‟s 
total foreign trade. Investigation of historical precedent entails international comparison of similar 
cases. A favourite example is the appreciation of the Japanese yen since the mid-1980s. We also 
look at the less-discussed cases of Germany, Singapore and Taiwan, due to their similar experiences 
with export-led growth and current account surpluses in recent decades. To facilitate the compari-
                                                 
1 Stare decisis is shorthand for the Latin expression stare decisis et quieta non movere, which means “to stand by what 
is decided and not disturb what is settled.” Yimeng Liu, Duo Qin and Xinhua He 
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son, we estimate quarterly REER misalignment series for the yen, the Deutsche mark (D-mark), the 
Singapore dollar and the Taiwan dollar, respectively, over relevant historical periods following the 
approach proposed in Qin and He (2011). 
We ask the following:  
  Are the Qin and He estimates of RMB misalignment, especially undervalued misa-
lignment, more severe or prolonged than those of the other four economies? 
  Do the long-run coefficients in the REER models of the four economies corroborate 
standard theories or those estimated for the China model?  
  Have relative net foreign assets played a significant and substantive role in equilibrat-
ing the REER in accordance with the relevant economy‟s surplus position? 
 
A positive answer to any of above questions is treated as empirical evidence of RMB ma-
nipulation. Notably, all of our comparison economies initially implemented managed floats and 
then moved to freer exchange rate regimes during their observation periods.
2 China, in contrast, 
maintained a de facto fixed exchange rate regime for most of the observation period used in Qin and 
He (2011).  
Qin and He point out that the length and magnitude of undervalued misalignment of the 
RMB appear distinctly more severe when narrowly measured vis-à-vis the US dollar and the euro. 
Thus, we ask if the misalignment estimates of the four economies are sensitive to the choice of trad-
ing partners vis-à-vis the home economy. (For example: Are our Japanese yen undervalued mis-
alignment estimates more severe when we restrict trading partners to the US and Euroland?)  
Finally, we consider how the movement of misalignment estimates for the home economy 
interacts with inflation and economic growth. This question is included mainly because the Japa-
nese economy fell into a deflationary and zero-interest liquidity trap after a period of relentless yen 
appreciation in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. McKinnon et al., 1999). We assume Chinese 
policymakers are well aware of Japan‟s experience. 
                                                 
2 For more description of the exchange rate regimes of these economies, see McKinnon and Ohno (2001), Deutsche 
Bundesbank (1999), MAS (2001) and Chou and Shih (1995).  
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Before proceeding to the full discussion, it is necessary to clarify two points. First, our pre-
sent investigation is focused on the cross-country comparison of the estimated REER misalign-
ments. We do not intend to elaborate on the consequences of the misalignments or deny the exi s-
tence of many historical differences between the recent RMB case and the four cases of our choice. 
Second, we are aware of the situation that there is no univ ersally agreed method of estimating 
REER misalignments and that the method we adopt may not be the optimal. Nevertheless, that 
should not affect the comparison as long as the same method is applied to all the cases.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly describes the relevant 
background of the four economies, compares their positions with China and summarises the litera-
ture on exchange rate misalignment estimates of the four economies. Sections 3 and 4 describe our 
modelling method and related data issues. Our main estimation results are discussed in section 5, 
where comparison with the results of the China model is also made. The last section concludes and 
offers a few lessons and policy considerations.  
 
 
2  Background of four economies for comparison 
 
As mentioned, Japan is the most popular comparison country in recent discussions of currency ma-
nipulation (see e.g. IMF World Economic Outlook, 2010; McKinnon and Schnabl, 2003; Yu, 2010). 
Japan‟s export-led growth took off in the 1970s, and its conspicuous economic success brought 
down enormous mercantile trade pressure. The 1985 Plaza Accord between the US, France, Ger-
many, the UK and Japan was an attempt to cool the situation, but it led to substantial yen apprecia-
tion against the dollar. This “ever-higher yen syndrome” has been blamed for exacerbating Japan‟s 
post-1990 recession and deflationary episode (McKinnon and Ohno, 2001). Figure 1 presents Japa-
nese GDP growth rates, inflation, openness ratios, and the yen exchange rate versus US$ from the 
late 1970s to 2000 (see the left-side four graphs). By comparing the relevant graphs in Figures 1 and 
3, we see that present-day China far exceeds Japan of that period in terms of openness. 
Singapore and Taiwan also experienced misalignments akin to China‟s. Singapore main-
tained a large current account surplus for several years, as shown from the third left-side graph of 
Figure 2. Singapore, a relatively small and very open economy, had total trade around three times of 
its GDP during the 1980s and the 1990s (the second left-side graph of Figure 2). Taiwan‟s experi-Yimeng Liu, Duo Qin and Xinhua He 
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ence somewhat presages the mainland; there was continued currency appreciation pressure during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s stemming from a bulging current account surplus and rapid trade 
growth (see right-side graphs in Figure 2). In Taiwan‟s case, too, the trade-to-GDP ratio in the ob-
served period was much higher than in China today. Taiwan, like Singapore is relatively small and 
foreign trade accounts a substantial part of its economy. Germany (and specifically West Germany 
prior to reunification) seems our best comparison. Its trade-to-GDP ratios during the 1980s were 
similar to the current Chinese level (see the second right-side graph in Figure 1), and after the Plaza 
Accord, the D-mark experienced a period of appreciation and Germany posted large current account 
surpluses (see right-side graphs in Figure 1). 
There is a sizeable body of literature on estimating the exchange rate misalignment of the 
four currencies under consideration. Table 1 provides a summary of some previous estimates rele-
vant to the historical periods of interest. It is immediately clear from the table that estimates vary 
depending on the modelling approach selected. Where the estimates seem most in agreement is the 
undervaluation of the yen in the early 1980s. It is also apparent that most estimates, especially those 
showing undervaluation, show little concurrence with the external trade and current account surplus 
positions of the economies. Considering the lack of regular time series in these estimates and the 
large difference in method, data coverage and choice of exchange rate indices (e.g. some use bilat-
eral rates and others use REER), we merely threat them as rough references and perform our own 
estimations to compare the misalignment situation of those historical periods with the RMB mis-
alignment estimates obtained by Qin and He (2011). The next three sections report our estimation 




3  Modelling method 
 
Empirical studies often model the real equilibrium exchange rate as the long-run solution condi-
tioned upon a set of economic fundamentals such as productivity differentials. Misalignment is then 
derived from deviations of the actual REER from its long-run solution (IEO, 2007; numerous IMF 
publications). Obviously, differences in choice of data, variable and model specification result in 
different long-run equilibrium rate estimates and their accompanying misalignment estimates. For-
tunately, this is only a minor concern in the comparative context as long as the selection criteria re- 
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main consistent across cases under consideration. We follow essentially the panel model procedure 
employed in Qin and He (2011), who deal with the shortcoming of the panel procedure of assumed 
homogeneity of all trading partners by applying a country-by-country modelling procedure to esti-
mate the bilateral currency misalignment series of the home country versus each of its trading part-
ners. Moreover, for the sake of consistency of model specification in cross-country comparison and 
simplicity, we stay with the theoretical approach in Qin and He (2011), i.e. we determine  the real 
equilibrium rate from two fundamentals: productivity differentials and the relative size of net for-
eign assets.
3 The first factor is approximated alternatively by the relative real per capita income and 
ratio of the consumer price index (CPI) to the producer price index (PPI). The second factor is re p-
resented by relative per capita net foreign assets. 
Denote  it r as the CPI-based real exchange rate of a home economy vis-à-vis economy i. 
Our basic panel model has two versions: 
 
   
    it it it i it
it it it i it
u NFA RPI r
u NFA GDP r
2 22 21 2
1 12 11 1
ln ln
ln ln
   
   
  
  
  ,    (1) 
 
where  i GDP,  i RPI  and  i NFA  denote respectively the relative real per capita GDP, the rela-
tive CPI-PPI ratios, the relative per capita net foreign assets between the home economy and econ-
omy i. In the standard theoretical setting, all   coefficients in (1) are normally expected to be posi-
tive. Specifically,  0 11    and  0 21    are expected due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Opposite 
signs may occur, however, when there is imperfect substitution between tradable and non-tradable 
goods,  or  imperfect  competition  (Benigno  and  Theonissen,  2003; MacDonald  and  Ricci,  2007; 
MacDonald and Dias, 2007). Likewise,  12   or  22   may become negative when sustained foreign 
direct investment results in deterioration of the country‟s NFA position and appreciation of its cur-
rency (Burgess et al., 2003). 
Model (1) is estimated by the panel dynamic OLS (DOLS) method developed by Kao et al. 
(1999) (see also Kao and Chiang, 2000). Since the method entails cointegration, panel unit-root 
                                                 
3 We tried to add the factor of real interest rate differentials, but found it virtually impossible to get consistently defined 
cross-country quarterly time-series data for the historical periods of interest. Fortunately, the identical variable coverage 
here with that used in Qin and He (2011) makes the estimates comparable – even if our reason for excluding the interest 
rate differentials (i.e. the lack of a free international capital market in China during the sample period) is different. Yimeng Liu, Duo Qin and Xinhua He 
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tests are carried out on the individual variables prior to estimation and on the residuals after estima-
tion using one lead and one lag of the difference variable terms. When the long-run coefficient es-
timate of an explanatory variable is statistically insignificant, we re-estimate the model excluding 
the corresponding variable to check whether the exclusion results in significant omitted-variable 
bias. 
Once relatively satisfactory estimation results are obtained, we use residuals from the panel 
DOLS estimation of (1) to derive a pair of misalignment series of the REER for each of the four 
economies concerned, 
t m
1  and 
t m
2 , by taking the trade-weighted geometric mean:
4 
 

































 ,  (2) 
 
where  it w  denotes the trade weight of economy i vis-à-vis the total foreign trade of the home econ-
omy under consideration. Obviously, the difference between  t m1  and  t m2  reflects the effect of 
choice of proxy variables for productivity differentials. When  t t m m 1 2  , i.e. price differentials 
generate a larger misalignment than income differentials, we take this as evidence of “unfair” com-
petiveness. As discussed above, Japan, Germany, Singapore and Taiwan are the home economies 
modelled one by one in turn.
5 
A  major  policy  concern  under  a  controlled  exchange  rate  regime  is  the  inflatio n-
ary/deflationary impact of exchange rate adjustments. In the present Chinese case, we assume the 
government is well aware of the danger of repeating the Japanese experience of currency appreci a-
tion and subsequent “lost decade.”
6 In this vein, we ask if such macroeconomic impact of exchange 
rate adjustments is due to the rate misalignment. We test for this by performing a Granger non-
                                                 
4 We adopt geometric, rather than arithmetic, mean. The geometric mean is widely used by the IMF, BIS and many 
other international organisations. 
5 For Germany, we only consider West Germany prior to the reunification in 1990. 
6 For discussion on whether excess yen appreciation was the main cause of the stagnation of the Japanese economy, see 
e.g. McKinnon et al. (1999), Heng (2009), Hayashi and  Prescott (2002), Hamada and Okada (2009), Krugman (1998), 
Posen (1998) and Obstfeld (2009).   
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4  Data coverage and related issues 
 
The quarterly data used mostly begin in the mid-to-late 1970s. Where quarterly data are unavailable 
(e.g. in the case of population), simple interpolation is used to produce quarterly series. The detailed 
data sources are given in the appendix. The fact that the historical periods of interest go back to two 
to three decades poses a serious data restriction on the numbers of trading partners that we can in-
clude. Selection of trading partners is based on the ranking of trade shares with the home economy 
in point. Data permitting, we try to include those with the highest ranks. 
Our data set covers 17 economies: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Ko-
rea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, 
UK and US. Since several Malaysian series start from 1983, Malaysia is excluded from the panel 
samples for the Japanese yen and the D-mark.
7 Both samples start from 1977 whereas the Japanese 
sample ends in 2000 and the German sample ends in 1990. The samples for the Singapore and Ta i-
wan dollars cover the period of 1984−2000. Time series of the trade shares these panels cover in the 
total trade of the home economies are plotted in Figure 4. As seen from these graphs, trade shares 
vary during the sample periods, but remain well above 50 % most of the time. The significant de-
crease of the shares in the Taiwan case is due to rapid growth of trading with mainland China. We 
would have like to include China in all the four panels as it becomes an increasingly important trad-
ing partner from the late 1980s onwards, but are prevented from doing so due to lack of data. In the 
German case, too, we cannot include several trading partners that ranked higher in their trading 
weights than some of those included for Asian economies due to inadequate data. 
Since the representativeness of panel-based REER series is susceptible to the trade cover-
age our selected panels, we check the representative adequacy by comparing our panel-based REER 
series with the series published by the IMF and the BIS (see right side of Figure 4).
8 The REER 
                                                 
7 The trade weights of Malaysia in the Japanese and German total trades were roughly 2 per cent and 0.3 per cent re-
spectively during 1980-90.  
8 IMF‟s publication does not cover Taiwan. Yimeng Liu, Duo Qin and Xinhua He 
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graphs suggest our panel-based series are relatively similar to the IMF and BIS series on the whole. 
There is some discrepancy in the German series but that is more pronounced between the IMF and 
the BIS series than between our series and the IMF and BIS series. Taiwan presents the largest dis-
crepancy as the BIS series do not cover Malaysia, the Philippines or Thailand (three economies 
whose trading weights with Taiwan traditionally rank well above some of the countries covered in 
the BIS panel, e.g. Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal and Spain). Hence, our 
REER is likely more representative than the BIS series. 
Qin and He (2011) show that the RMB misalignment series are sensitive to panel choice. 
Their estimates from a sub-panel of the US and Euroland countries differ substantially from the re-
sults based on a full panel of 22 economies. Here, we adopt the same strategy and construct a sub-




5  Empirical results and comparison  
 
Our key estimation results are reported in Table 2.
9 A striking feature is that the coefficient est i-
mates for  it NFA  are negative and small in the full-panel estimations (although insignificant in the 
Singapore and Taiwan models, and the GDP version of the Japan model). This result is similar to 
the China case as shown in Tables 2−4 in Qin and He (2011). This finding implies that relatively 
large net foreign asset differentials due to sustained current account surplus of a home economy 
does not necessarily result in a positive and significant long-run effect on the REER of its currency. 
Singapore, for example, has the highest current account surplus among the four (see Figure 2) even 
if  it NFA  remains insignificant in all versions of the Singapore model and seems to confirm the pre-
vious study of Montiel (1997). The finding imposes serious doubt on theories that assume as the 
key condition an equilibrium current account balance position for equilibrium REER. 
Table 2 also reports key sub-panel estimation results, i.e.  sub-panels that include only the 
US and Euroland economies. If we compare the sub-panel results with those from the full panel, we 
see the biggest difference is in the Japan case, where the coefficient estimates of  it NFA  become sig-
                                                 
9 Unit-root test, run on individual variables of    it r ln ,    it GDP ln ,    it RPI ln  and  it NFA  shows that all the series are 
first-difference stationary. The test on the residuals after the DOLS estimation confirms stationarity as well. The test 
results are not reported to keep the paper short.  
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nificantly positive, albeit very small. This likely reflects the fact that the repeated yen appreciations 
that began in the late 1980s were driven largely by pressures from the US and other Western par t-
ners. 
Figure 5 plots the estimated misalignment series of the four economies along with the mis-
alignment series of the RMB estimated by Qin and He (2011) to facilitate comparison. Two pairs of 
misalignment series (one for the  i GDP version of the model and the other the  i RPI  version) are 
drawn for each economy (one pair from the full-panel estimation and the other the sub-panel esti-
mation). This lets us examine the misalignment situation of the four currencies in turn. 
 
Japanese Yen 
Here, it is discernible from the first row of Figure 5 that the yen remains undervalued throughout 
the first half of 1980s, reaching 15−20 % when estimated by the  i GDP version of our model, and 
over 25 % with our  i RPI  version. The misalignment series switched into a sustained overvaluation 
phase after 1985, with the exception of two brief periods (around 1990-1 with the bursting of stock 
and real estate price bubbles and in 1997 with the launch of speculative attacks on Asian curren-
cies). The yen‟s overvalued misalignment peaks around 1995 at above 20 % when estimated by the 
i GDP version of the model and above 40 % with the  i RPI  version. On the whole, these estimates 
do not differ substantially from what has been reported in the literature. In fact, they are relatively 
close to those obtained by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009). If we look at the undervalued period of the 
RMB during the early-to-mid-2000s (see the last row of Figure 5), the magnitude (5−10 %) is far 
less than that of the yen during the early 1980s prior to the 1985 Plaza Accord. Moreover, we see 
two noticeable differences. The RMB was distinctly more undervalued against the US$ and the euro 
than the yen, which experienced misalignments that remained more or less the same whether evalu-
ated by the full panel or sub-panel of the US and the Euroland. Moreover, the yen misalignment es-
timates by the  i RPI  version of the model were more severe than those of the  i GDP version − the 
opposite of the RMB case. These results suggest that the Japanese case during the early 1980s was 
more severe, more universal in terms of currency coverage and more relative price-based than the 
Chinese case during the mid-2000s. This finding confirms previous studies showing that the Japa-
nese trade sector experienced rapid productivity growth during the decade starting from the mid-
1970s, especially versus the US (Marston, 1986; McKinnon and Ohno, 2001).  Yimeng Liu, Duo Qin and Xinhua He 
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Nevertheless, from our comparative perspective, this finding is somewhat unexpected as 
the Japanese economy of the 1980s is generally believed to have been freer than that of China in the 
2000s, both in terms of exchange rate management and price-setting of traded goods. 
 
Deutsche Mark 
Like the yen, we see the D-mark is undervalued during the first half of the 1980s, but to a lesser de-
gree (hitting a maximum of about 10 %, see second row of Figure 5). Similar to the yen, the mis-
alignment estimates are also larger in magnitude from the  i RPI  version of the model than the per-
capita-income-based version (the  i GDP coefficient estimate becomes insignificant in the sub-panel 
case), and the difference between the full-panel and the sub-panel estimates is largely indiscernible. 
Unlike the yen, the undervalued margin of the D-mark ebbs away gradually after the 1985 Plaza 
Accord without significant over-correction. Our estimates during the first half of the 1980s are con-
sistent to the history prior to the Plaza Accord and in agreement with those by Fischer and Sauern-
heimer (2002). Roughly, the length and severity of the undervalued misalignment in the D-mark of 
the 1980s are comparable to the full-panel result of the RMB during the mid-2000s, although the 
RMB misalignment is less pronounced in the relative-price version of the model. Again unlike the 
RMB case, the full-panel and sub-panel results in the D-mark case do not differ much, indicating 
that the misalignment in the D-mark during the 1980s was more universal than that of the RMB 
during the 2000s. 
 
Singapore Dollar 
Our estimation shows that the Singapore dollar went from being greatly overvalued prior to 1985 to 
a period of undervaluation in the late 1980s. It then became slightly overvalued during the 1990s in 
the run-up to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The undervalued misalignment is around 2−5 % in the 
late 1980s when estimated using the full-panel data set, and reaches over 10 % in the sub-panel es-
timation (see the price-based model version). The latter result resembles the RMB case, although 
the sub-panel feature in the RMB case is far more pronounced from the per-capita-income version 
of the model than the price-based version. Taken as a whole, our results are quite similar to those of 
MacDonald (2004). What is particularly interesting in the present case is that we find no evidence 
of the Singapore dollar being substantially undervalued during the 1990s prior to the Asian crisis,  
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despite of the fact that the country‟s current account surplus continues to rise (see the third graph on 
the left side of Figure 2). This result suggests that persistent current account surpluses do not neces-
sarily imply a downward exchange-rate misalignment. 
 
Taiwan Dollar 
The misalignment series of the Taiwan dollar from the two model versions are the closest of the 
four currencies (see the fourth row of Figure 5). Otherwise, the misalignment series share certain 
similarities with those of the Singapore dollar, which is found to be undervalued during the mid-
1980s, followed by a sustained overvaluation lasting until the 1997 Asian crisis. Here, the over-
valuation starts earlier and is much more pronounced than in the case of the Singapore dollar. This 
is likely due to speculation driven by the widely held expectation of continued Taiwan dollar appre-
ciation and rapid growth in Taiwan‟s current account surplus from expanding foreign trade. Inter-
estingly, the difference between the full-panel estimates and the sub-panel estimates are the largest 
of the four cases. During the mid-to-late-1980s, the undervalued misalignment is around 5 % for 
over two years when estimated using the full-panel data set. The period extends to over three years 
and reaches over 15 % when estimated by the sub-panel data set. This situation closely resembles 
the RMB case, indicating that the appreciation expectation or pressure at the time was heavily based 
on US and the Western regional perspectives. 
These misalignment estimates provide us a concise historical perspective on the recent 
RMB misalignment situation. The magnitude and currency coverage of the undervalued misalign-
ment of the Japanese yen prior to the Plaza Accord is more severe than the RMB during the early-
to-mid-2000s. The RMB undervalued situation is more comparable to the D-mark case during the 
1980s in terms of both magnitude and length. The currency-limited nature of the RMB undervalua-
tion (i.e. the undervaluation is more severe when evaluated against the US$ and the euro than a 
large set of currencies) echoes the situation of the Taiwan dollar and Singapore dollar in the mid-
1980s. 
If we look at the adjustment process of those undervalued periods of the four currencies, 
we notice that the adjustment processes in the Japanese yen and the Taiwan dollar are more volatile 
than those of the D-mark and the Singapore dollar. History tells us that while the Japanese economy 
sank into recession and deflation during the 1990s and Taiwan experienced higher inflation and 
lower growth in the 1990s, Singapore enjoyed fairly robust and stable economic growth right up to Yimeng Liu, Duo Qin and Xinhua He 
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the 1997 Asian crisis.
10 These differing experiences lead us to the question how the dynamics of 
REER misalignment adjustment interact with the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation and GDP growth. Since it is beyond the scope of the present study to specify a  full macro 
model of an open economy, we simply seek primary answers to the question by means of a Granger 
non-causality test. Interestingly, our test based on a three -variable VAR (Vector AutoRegression) 
(GDP growth, inflation and REER misalignment) resul ts in no Granger causality between GDP 
growth and REER misalignment series for any of the economies, including China. Therefore, the 
test results reported in Table 3 are based on a two -variable VAR. It is obvious from the table that 
the evidence is decisively one-sided – it is the REER misalignment that Granger-causes inflation 
rather than vice versa. In other words, the REER disequilibrium is shown to have a leading and “er-
ror-correction” impact on the inflation dynamics.
11 In particular, this finding corroborates diagnoses 
of the Japan‟s liquidity trap by economists such as McKinnon et al. (1999) and Obstfeld (2009), and 
provides a sound basis for concern about the danger of over-adjusting exchange rates as Chinese 
policymakers continue their efforts to fight inflation. 
 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
 
The empirical results obtained here provide no positive answers to any of our initial three questions. 
The long-run coefficient estimates of the REER models of the four economies do not corroborate 
the standard theories more than those estimated of the China model by Qin and He (2011). The role 
of relative net foreign assets is marginal and nonstandard. Moreover, we find precedents to Qin and 
He‟s RMB misalignment estimates in the estimated misalignment series of the four economies con-
sidered in the present study. The undervaluation of the Japanese yen prior to 1985 was found to be 
more severe, more universal and more price-differential-based than that of the RMB during the 
mid-2000s. The Singapore dollar was not found to be undervalued in the ten years spanning 1987 to 
the Asian crisis, despite a rapid increase of the country‟s current account surplus. In short, the em-
pirical evidence here suggests that RMB “manipulation” during the last decade  has been no more 
substantial than that of the Japanese yen, the D-mark, the Singapore dollar or the Taiwan dollar in 
                                                 
10 It is difficult to discuss Germany because of the reunification. 
11 Note that the error terms in model (1) would become effectively error -correction terms for inflation if we extend (1) 
into the error-correction model and assume rigidity of the nominal rate due to a controlled exchange rate regime.  
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the recent history. Moreover, there is no evidence that a fixed exchange rate regime results in more 
severe rate misalignments or pricing differentials than regimes with freer exchange rate policies, or 
that the currency of an economy is necessarily undervalued if the economy experiences a rapid 
build-up in net foreign assets. 
Finally, our study suggests that the volatility in exchange rate disequilibrium subsequent to 
the rate adjustment is likely to propagate into a home economy via inflation. Policymakers should 
thus be wary of the possible side-effect of exchange rate over-adjustment on inflation when such 





HE: Home economy, i.e.  Japan, Germany, Singapore, Taiwan; subscript i = trading partner country 
i in the panel. 
ri = (CPI(HE)/CPIi)( ei /e(HE currency)); e = exchange rate per US$; all ri series are adjusted to 
2000Q1 = 1. 
GDPi = (per capita GDP(HE)/ per capita GDPi)( ei /e(HE currency)). 
RPIi = (CPI(HE)/ PPI(HE))/( CPIi / PPIi). 
NFAi = (per capita NFA(HE)/ per capita NFAi); NFA is calculated as the historical sum of current 
account balance. 
Wi = (HE‟s exporti + HE‟s importi)/(sum of HE‟s exports and imports to all economies in the panel). 
Data sources and derivation 
Exchange rates: Post-1999 data for French franc, D-mark, lire and guilder are from Datastream; 
Taiwan  dollar:  1977Q1-1980Q1  from  IFS  (IMF  International  Financial  Statistics  CD-ROM), 
1980Q2-2000Q4 from Taiwan Quarterly Economic Indicators; rest from IFS. 
CPI: Germany, Korea and Taiwan from Datastream; rest from IFS, 2005=100. 
PPI: France before 1998, German and Taiwan from Datastream; rest are wholesale prices or pro-
ducer prices from IFS, 2005=100. 
Population (annual): Germany from Datastream; rest from IFS. Quarterly series are interpolated. 
Current account balance in US$: Taiwan post-1979 data from Datastream; Malaysia data for 1984-
1998 and Singapore data for 1977-1994 are annual and used as end-year observations; rest from 
IFS. Yimeng Liu, Duo Qin and Xinhua He 
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Exports and imports: Taiwan: 1977-1987 from Taiwan Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports; 
1988-2000 from Datastream; rest from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
GDP in constant price: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US derived from IFS (except for Italy and Sweden of 1977-79, which in 
turn are derived from Datastream). Singapore and Taiwan calculated from Datastream. Malaysia for 
1984-1987 and Thailand for 1977-1992 calculated from annual IFS data and interpolated into quar-
terly frequency (the rest of period calculated from IFS). Philippines for 1977-1980 calculated from 
Datastream annual data and interpolated into quarterly frequency; post-1981 period calculated from 
IFS.  Series with significant seasonal fluctuations are seasonally adjusted using Eviews. 
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Figure 1   Main macroeconomic indicators: Japan and West Germany 
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GDP growth (solid line). Inflation (dotted line). 
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Figure 2  Main macroeconomic indicators: Singapore and Taiwan 
Singapore  Taiwan 
   
GDP growth (solid line). Inflation (dotted line) 
   
Ratio of foreign trade to GDP 
   
Ratio of current account to GDP 
   
Exchange rate to US$ 
Data sources: For Singapore, IMF IFS in annual frequency. For Taiwan, Datastream in quarterly frequency; some 
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Figure 3  Main macroeconomic indicators: China 
 
GDP growth (solid); Inflation (dotted) 
 
Ratio of foreign trade to GDP 
 
Ratio of current account to GDP 
 
Exchange rate to US$ 
Data sources: IMF IFS for the period 1999-2008 in annual frequency; 2009 data are from China Statistics Abstracts 
2010. 
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Figure 4   Trade shares of the panels and REER series 
 
Trade share of the panel in the total 
trade of the home economy 
(%) 
REER series 
Our panel-based series (grey line) 
IMF (dotted line) 
BIS (black line) 
Japan 
   
Germany 
   
Singapore 
   
Taiwan 
   
























































1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 22/ 2011 
 
 
  25 
Figure 5  REER misalignment series 
GDP-based version (solid line)  
RPI-based version (dotted line) 
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Note: For the RMB misagliment series, the full panel consists of 22 trading partners and the sub-panel 7 partners 
covering the US and the Euro-zone countries from the full panel (see Qin and He, 2011). 
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Table 1  Sample of previous estimates of exchange rate misalignments 









Overvalued during 1980-82 for over 
10%; undervalued around 5% during 
1984-5; slightly overvalued 1986-89; 









REER (graph and table):  
Undervalued slightly 1983-86; 10-17% 







35% undervalued in 1985;  








REER & bilateral rate to US$ (graph): 
Undervalued during 1980-89, around 
20% in REER and 35% in bilateral rate 







Nominal bilateral rate to US$ (table): 
Undervalued around 10-200+% during 
1980-85; overvalued around 10-50% 
during 1987-2000, except 1990. 
PPP 
Bénassy-





REER (graph and table): 
Undervalued over 20% during 1980-85; 
overvalued 1986-2001 except 1990 and 
1997-98; 1988Q1: overvalued around 
17-20% in REER or 21-24% in real bi-
lateral rate to US$ 
 











REER (graph and table): 
Undervalued up to 20% during 1973-80; 
slightly overvalued during 1981-88; 2% 
undervaluation in 1990. 
BEER 




Slightly overvalued during 1982-83; un-
dervalued up to 5% during 1984-90 ex-
cept for a brief overvaluation around 
1988. 
NATREX model 
Isard and  Not spe- REER (table):  MBF (IMF)  
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Overvalued in late 1970s up to 10%; 
slightly undervalued around 1981 and  
1985-86; overvalued from 1987 to early 













Undervalued up to 5% during 1980-85 
and 1990-91; overvalued up to around 
10% during 1986-89 and 1992-93. 
BEER 






Bilateral real rate to US$ (graph and ta-
ble): 
Undervalued in the 1990s, except 
around 1991 and 1996; about 6% under-
valued in May 1997. 











Undervalued during 1984-89 and 1993-








REER (graph):  
Overvalued up to about 8% during 
1984-85 and 1997; mildly undervalued 






Chinn (2000)  1970-
1997 
monthly 
Bilateral real rate to Japanese yen and 
US$ (graph and table): 
Overvalued up to 20% during 1990-93, 
and undervalued up to 20% during 
1993-6 to the yen. Undervalued by 9% 
May 1997 to the US$. 






Nominal bilateral rate to US$ (table): 
Undervalued during 1980-96, from over 
400% in 1981 to 3% in 1993; underva-
lued again after the East Asian crisis up 
to over 30% in 2000. 
 
PPP 
Note: NATREX stands for “natural real exchange rate,” BEER for “behavioural equilibrium exchange rate,” FEER for 
“fundamental equilibrium exchange rate,” MBF for “macroeconomic balanced framework” and PPP for “purchasing 
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Table 2   Key estimation results of model (1) 
  The upper equation of (1)  The lower equation of (1) 
Conditioning 
variables    it GDP ln   it NFA     it RPI ln   it NFA  
Japanese yen; sample period: 1977Q1−2000Q4; full panel 
DOLS  0.3365  -0.0001  1.4666  -0.0003 
s.d.  0.0075  0.0001  0.0656  0.0001 
2 R
  0.9974  0.9952 
Japanese yen; sample period: 1977Q1−2000Q4; sub-panel 
DOLS  0.3528  0.0005  1.9462  0.0008 
s.d.  0.0082  0.0002  0.0743  0.0003 
2 R   0.9985  0.9973 
D-mark; sample period: 1977Q1−1990Q4; full panel 
DOLS  0.3658  -0.0006  0.9167  -0.0003 
s.d.  0.0231  0.0001  0.0904  0.0001 
2 R
  0.9980  0.9978 
D-mark; sample period: 1977Q1−1990Q4; sub-panel 
DOLS  0.0679  -0.0011  1.329  -0.0002 
s.d.  0.0385  0.0003  0.0964  0.0002 
2 R
  0.9984  0.999 
Singapore dollar; sample period: 1984Q1−2000Q4; full panel 
DOLS  0.2969  -0.000006  0.5399  -0.0001 
s.d.  0.0121  0.0001  0.0419  0.0001 
2 R
  0.9983  0.9974 
Singapore dollar; sample period: 1984Q1−2000Q4; sub-panel 
DOLS  0.2827  -0.0003  0.1932  -0.0002 
s.d.  0.0189  0.0002  0.0677  0.0002 
2 R   0.9975  0.9965 
Taiwan dollar; sample period 1984Q1−2000Q4; full panel 
DOLS  0.2556  -0.00004  0.7264  -0.00008 
s.d.  0.0118  0.00006  0.0412  0.00007 
2 R
  0.9987  0.9983 
Taiwan dollar; sample period 1984Q1−2000Q4; sub-panel 
DOLS  0.1458  0.0003  0.2285  0.0003 
s.d.  0.0177  0.0003  0.0685  0.0004 
2 R   0.9985  0.9979 
Note: s.d. = standard deviation.    
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 22/ 2011 
 
 
  29 
 


















2   
Japan (full)  4.6268 [0.0009]  0.7205 [0.610]  3.8844 [0.0033]  1.3919 [0.2362] 
(sub-panel)  3.6965 [0.0046]  0.4844 [0.7869]  2.1445 [0.0685]  0.8379 [0.5267] 
Germany (full)  3.1223 [0.0243]  2.0273 [0.1075]  3.8990 [0.0087]  1.0235 [0.4060] 
(sub-panel)  2.7111 [0.0423]  1.7842 [0.1495]  4.1545 [0.0062]  1.1376 [0.3516] 
Singapore (full)  2.6896 [0.0404]  3.0114 [0.0256]  4.1441 [0.0053]  0.7951 [0.5335] 
(sub-panel)  2.7288 [0.0382]  1.7920 [0.1436]  5.0468 [0.0015]  1.0700 [0.3802] 
Taiwan (full)  0.5614 [0.7290]  1.0330 [0.3986]  0.5077 [0.7691]  1.3789 [0.2532] 
(sub-panel)  1.2995 [0.2785]  0.7206 [0.5816]  0.9662 [0.4471]  0.9670 [0.4430] 
China (full)  3.3776 [0.0230]  1.0765 [0.3876]  1.7282 [0.1729]  1.1148 [0.3700] 
(sub-panel)  4.0518 [0.0106]  0.8606 [0.6000]  2.7041 [0.0515]  0.6813 [0.6110] 
Note: The signs  
it m  and 
it m   indicate, respectively, whether misalignment G-causes inflation and whether 
inflation G-causes misalignment. Statistics in brackets are probability values; Japan and Taiwan 5 lags; 
Germany, Singapore and China 4 lags.  
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